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A legal world is built only to the extent that there are commit-
ments that place bodies on the line . . . the interpretive com-
mitments of offi cials are realized, indeed, in the fl esh.
Robert Cover “Violence and the Word” (208)
At the end of Chinua Achebe’s novel, Things Fall Apart, readers fi nd the 
narrative abandoned and replaced with another story. The novel tells the 
story of Okonkwo, a man from the Nigerian tribe of Umuofi a who, de-
spite a destitute upbringing, becomes one of the most powerful leaders 
of his clan. Achebe’s protagonist, however, is anything but an endearing 
hero. Haunted by the memory of his poor and hapless father, Okonkwo 
becomes a proud, short-tempered man, who beats his wives and treats 
those around him with a hard-edged lack of sympathy. The novel con-
cludes with the arrival of Christian missionaries from England, who 
convert members of Okonkwo’s clan, establish a church, and eventually 
set up a court. Following an altercation with the priest and some of the 
church’s converts, Okonkwo and fi ve other men are arrested and beaten. 
After their release, the clan calls a meeting, which is interrupted by the 
guards who had earlier imprisoned and beaten the men. This intrusion 
proves more than Okonkwo can bear: overcome with humiliation and 
rage, he confronts one of the guards and kills him. 
The chapter that follows this episode shifts from Okonkwo’s point of 
view to that of the unnamed District Commissioner, who comes to the 
village in search of the guard’s murderer and is led by the clansmen to a 
tree from which Okonkwo’s body hangs. The tragedy of his suicide would 
seem to be a natural place for Achebe’s novel to end. Instead, Things Fall 
Apart concludes with the beginning of another story, which announces 
itself in the omniscient narrator’s shift in focus from Okonkwo to the 
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District Commissioner. Reframing Okonkwo’s narrative from within 
the Commissioner’s perspective, the narrator concludes the story from 
the subject position of a man who knows nothing of Okonkwo save the 
scant facts of the messenger’s murder and the murderer’s suicide. As the 
newly anointed protagonist leaves deep in thought about how the dead 
man’s story might enter the wider colonial picture, Achebe’s title and the 
novel’s epigraph from Yeats’ poem “The Second Coming”—“things fall 
apart, the center cannot hold”—acquires new force, infl ected with the 
strained power relations of colonialism. In these moments, the man we 
had taken to be the novel’s central fi gure is undone, and becomes little 
more than a small, anonymous part in a very different story:
The Commissioner went away, taking three or four of the 
soldiers with him. In the many years in which he had toiled 
to bring civilization to different parts of Africa he had 
learned a number of things. One of them was that a District 
Commissioner must never attend to such undignifi ed details 
as cutting a hanged man from the tree. Such attention would 
give the natives a poor opinion of him. In the book which he 
planned to write he would stress that point. As he walked back 
to the court he thought about that book. Every day brought 
him some new material. The story of this man who had killed 
a messenger and hanged himself would make interesting read-
ing. One could almost write a whole chapter on him. Perhaps 
not a whole chapter but a reasonable paragraph, at any rate. 
There was so much else to include, and one must be fi rm in 
cutting details. He had already chosen the title of the book, 
after much thought: The Pacifi cation of the Primitive Tribes of 
the Lower Niger. (208–208) 
The heart of Achebe’s novel—Okonkwo’s story—turns out to be a 
minor narrative within a larger one, reduced to a footnote in the master 
colonial narrative represented by The Pacifi cation of the Primitive Tribes 
of the Lower Niger. The tragedy that Achebe’s novel records, then, is the 
process by which Okonkwo’s narrative recedes into the background of 
another, becoming an “undignifi ed detail” that those in power would 
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do best to ignore. Okonkwo’s suicide is reduced to “material” for the 
Commissioner’s story, the scale of his life cut down to the size of a 
“chapter,” even “a reasonable paragraph.” 
I begin with Achebe’s novel not to make a claim about its place within 
the larger context of African literature. I invoke it, rather, to introduce 
and animate the terms of this essay’s consideration of British colonial law 
as it was practiced in Nigeria. Viewed from the positions of both legal 
and literary scholarship, Things Fall Apart provides us with an occasion 
to refl ect on the relationship between native and colonial law, and to do 
so in narratological terms. As Achebe’s novel suggests, this relationship 
unfolds through a double-edged process of shortening and lengthening: 
the condensing and shrinking of one story and the simultaneous expan-
sion of another, more epic narrative. The combined force of these trans-
formations, I will argue, is accompanied by a dramatic shift in register, 
one that renders the colonized subject anonymous. Moreover, I will go 
on to argue that this effacement of identity lays the foundation for indi-
vidual stories to do the work of documentation. In this essay, I examine 
the means through which colonial law transformed the stories of sin-
gular subjects within the legal framework, enlisting them, through an 
editorial process, in the project of documentation and the related task of 
elaborating a narrative of colonial justice.
Achebe’s ending, to be sure, opens up a range of interpretive possibili-
ties, positing—among other things—the indelibility of native stories, 
which persist in spite of colonial attempts to quash them. Along such 
lines, Okonkwo’s suicide might be grasped as an act of defi ance—an 
emphatic refusal to be co-opted by the Commissioner and his soldiers. 
My own focus here, however, begins by approaching the novel’s conclu-
sion as a depiction of how colonial texts, written by more powerful au-
thors, replaced native stories. To suggest as much, however, is to offer 
only a partial view of the grounds that make possible such a replace-
ment. For the novel’s closing paragraphs relate not only what happens 
to Okonkwo’s story, but also where this transformation occurs: “As he 
walked back to the court he thought about that book.” The place where 
things fall apart turns out to be a location between two positions, be-
tween Okonkwo’s hanged body in the village of Iguedo and the British 
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colonial court. It is here, in the movement from one to the other—on 
subtle but unmistakably legal terrain—that the book that promises to 
incorporate Okonkwo’s life in the form of “a reasonable paragraph” takes 
shape in the District Commissioner’s imagination. There is something 
in the transition from village to court—a movement towards the law—
that makes it possible for the District Commissioner to conceive of his 
book. In presenting The Pacifi cation of the Primitive Tribes of the Lower 
Niger as the last word on Okonkwo’s life, Things Fall Apart gestures to-
wards the force that textualization exerts in a colonial framework, pro-
jecting its as-yet-unwritten coda not simply as narrative, but as written 
text. Crucially, however, this shift to writing occurs not simply through 
the act of inscription, but through the editorial work that precedes it. 
“One must be fi rm in cutting details,” editing out minutiae that detract 
from the larger issues in the study of pacifi cation. 
The seemingly ethical terms in which the Commissioner justifi es cut-
ting the details of his volume are exposed as pretense when we consider a 
different kind of cutting that he refuses to do: namely, the act of cutting 
down Okonkwo’s body from the tree: “a District Commissioner must 
never attend to such undignifi ed details as cutting a hanged man from 
the tree.” This literal body may well have offered an occasion for com-
passion, a chance for British administration to demonstrate its humane 
treatment of its colonized subjects. The Commissioner rejects this pos-
sibility, however, in favor of a more pedagogical aim: “Such attention 
would give the natives a poor opinion of him. In the book which he 
planned to write he would stress that point.” The radically different ob-
jects of this cutting underscore the injustice in their being related at all. 
Simply stated, it is morally repugnant to equate the task of cutting down 
a hanged body with the labor of cutting the details of a life from a story 
that would purport to explain it. These cuttings may indeed strike an 
important contrast, but they are treated with equal steadfastness by the 
Commissioner in his determination to “stress that point” of not cutting 
down the dead man, as well as in his refl ection that “one must be fi rm 
in cutting details.” 
The Commissioner’s stiff resolve confi rms Walter Benjamin famous 
assertion in “Theses on the Philosophy of History” that there is “no 
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document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of 
barbarism” (256). What emerges as especially salient here is not simply 
the relationship between barbarism and writing but more specifi cally, 
the brutality of documentation, the process through which a body of 
work, a story, an individual life must pass in order to be recognized—
and recorded—as a document. It is not just the text that produces vio-
lence, in other words, but a specifi c kind of text: one that testifi es to, 
documents, and establishes facts. The trajectory by which this violence 
exerts itself—the element that makes it violent, in other words—is an-
other matter. It is violent, ultimately, because it effaces. The story of an 
individual becomes an example, a detail in a larger story of administra-
tive success in colonial Africa. 
It is important, moreover, that this transition is not one of outright 
elimination but of compression: the reduction of a life, and the narra-
tive depicting that life, into a chapter or a paragraph. This process sug-
gests the subtle complexity with which law, history and narrative were 
woven together in colonial Africa—a subtlety often overlooked when 
colonialism is imagined primarily as a system that ruled out compet-
ing indigenous legal practices. I am not suggesting here that British co-
lonial policies did not eradicate native forms of justice; they did. I am 
proposing, rather, that a critical evaluation of colonialism’s development 
demands more specifi city than general descriptions of political power 
dynamics admit. In particular, it is this work of compression, and the 
redaction it enables—the ability to lift a compact story from one con-
text and embed it in another—that is a central mechanism by which 
colonial law literally overwrites native law. I would like to suggest how 
this happens through an analysis of an exemplary opinion from colonial 
Nigeria, Lewis v. Bankole. Momentarily, I will be examining this highly 
signifi cant case, which was among the fi rst to consider the question of 
property rights within the context of British colonial Africa. I want fi rst, 
however, to situate this case in its colonial context by setting out some 
basic features of the British treatment of African customary law. As I 
will explain, colonial law reduced and recast existing indigenous narra-
tives and practices of law with a view to creating a more just society, one 
modeled upon British jurisprudence. 
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I.
The application of British law in Africa was heralded as one of England’s 
most valuable contributions to its colonies, promising to institute a 
legacy of reason and tolerance in a context that the British saw as ut-
terly chaotic. Even as the colonial era waned and its critics became more 
numerous, the sentiment persisted that common law’s infl uence in the 
colonies had been, on the whole, a positive one. As one legal scholar 
noted in the Journal of African Law at the dawn of many African na-
tions’ independence, “British administration in overseas countries has 
conferred no greater benefi t than English law and justice” (Roberts-
Wray 66). Underwriting this conviction was the long-held view of the 
British judge and, by extension, the system he represented, as a preserver 
and protector of African society. A colonial judge in Nigeria viewed his 
court’s particular duty in this way: 
I regard this court in its equity jurisdiction as in some mea-
sure by virtue of the jurisdiction sections of the Supreme Court 
Ordinance ‘the keeper of the conscience’ of native communi-
ties in regard to the absolute enforcement of alleged native cus-
toms. (Ajayi 104)
The salutary appraisal of western jurisprudence in colonial Africa re-
fl ected the law’s purported pluralism in integrating native custom with 
imported English law. Such integration, however, was idealistic at best: in 
reality, legal issues were addressed through parallel legal systems, that of 
English-administered courts and of the Native Courts, which were pre-
sided over by local chiefs. If a case could not be settled in a Native Court 
of Appeal, it was brought before a superior (Magistrates’ or Supreme) 
Court. British offi cials in these courts were instructed to apply native 
or customary law to colonial subjects, provided that this law met the 
requirements of the Repugnancy Clause, which excluded practices that 
were anathema to “justice, equity, and good conscience” (Roberts-Wray 
77). In theory, this integration was meant to tolerate and preserve exist-
ing African traditions by applying law in its local context. In practice, 
the confl uence of these two legal systems often resulted in misreading 
and fragmentation, as magistrates and judges frequently misunderstood, 
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and consequently misapplied, native law. The result was a system choked 
with confusion, in which British offi cials tended to construe indigenous 
practices according to their own assumptions and priorities. Not surpris-
ingly, African customs often did not meet the repugnancy test, and those 
that did were frequently misunderstood by magistrates and judges, who 
interpreted exceptional customs as legal practices. 
Ironically, the repugnancy doctrine formalized a haphazard editorial 
process, embedding the acceptable elements of native custom into colo-
nial law through an irregular method of incongruent decisions. In their 
new imperial context, these traditions acquired a textual and political 
stability that reinforced the aims of empire rather than sustaining a local 
past. Legal scholar Peter Fitzpatrick argues:
The potent implication of the repugnancy clause is that the 
native does not have a distinct and integral project since, with 
the repugnancy clause, a part of the resident culture can be 
denied here and a part there without any harm to a signifi cant 
fabric of existence. Such an ultimate negation by imperialism 
was profoundly identifi ed by Fanon as the fragmentation of a 
life once lived and the consequent rigidifi cation of the frag-
ments, the dynamic of which is now external to them. (110) 
The diffi culty of determining customary law, moreover, was com-
pounded by the fact that this law was rooted in oral tradition; it was, 
quite literally, unreadable. It is with this illegibility in mind, perhaps, 
that British administrators instituted the practice of having native expert 
witnesses testify to the existence of their own laws—testimonies which 
subsequently would be recorded and integrated into the common law 
doctrine of stare decisis, the practice of relying on past precedents. Since 
stare decisis was not part of native law, the assumption that precedents 
existed and could be woven handily into the fabric of customary law 
changed this law beyond recognition, often turning a misinformed in-
terpretation of custom into a binding decision. By recording decisions 
in this way, British legal administrators established “a body of precedent, 
turning local law into something akin to English case law. Precedents 
were invoked and debated not only in British courts, but also in indig-
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enous ones, where actors sometimes framed their arguments against the 
backdrop of their understanding of how matters would be handled in 
colonial courts” (Mann and Roberts 14). The insistence also created, in 
legal practice and legal writing, a history—a juridical lineage through 
which the past could be traced and followed. Confounded by this com-
plex network of intentions and circumstances—the ambiguous interface 
between the two legal regimes— administrators, judges, plaintiffs and 
defendants often missed each other in the dim light at the intersection 
of English and customary law.
As a way of mastering the potential uncertainty that could arise, colo-
nial administrators drew heavily on the work of anthropologists. I will 
argue that the court in Lewis v. Bankole, in calling expert witnesses to 
testify to native practices, conducted itself in the manner of an investi-
gative anthropologist. It is a well-documented fact that anthropologists 
were anything but foreign bodies in colonial legal policies, an involve-
ment that resonates throughout Things Fall Apart in the omniscient 
narrator’s voice, which often sounds curiously like that of a lay anthro-
pologist. British administration of Africa had a history of drawing upon 
anthropological research, which was seen as objective, thorough, and 
unhampered by ideology. It thus became a critical and fi tting ally in ju-
rists’ efforts to export British law to Africa. As one writer wistfully put 
it, “it is here that the work of the anthropologist is of such great value; 
he has the time to observe, he has no work which has to be done in a 
stated time, in fact he has no axe to grind except to obtain the informa-
tion he desires” (Roberts 50). Such sentiment was not uncommon in the 
development of colonial law and administration, lending its architects 
an even-handed tone that was the benchmark of effective lawmaking 
and offering a studious, scrupulous promise of impartiality stripped of 
ideological underpinnings. 
For their part, anthropologists were in no hurry to dismiss such praise. 
Even those critical of colonial practices were quick to defend their merits 
and overall good intentions—as did Edwin Smith, President in 1937 
of the Royal Anthropological Institute. Smith writes apologetically in 
his introduction to a slim volume entitled Tangled Justice, “In throwing 
doubt upon the wisdom of some of the laws which have been put in force 
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in Africa one is not impugning the motive, nor questioning the ability, 
of the men responsible. The ideal of justice and good government is the 
guiding star of British administration” (Roberts 2). Presumably part of 
the justice and good government to which Smith refers is not unrelated 
to its reliance on the fi ndings of his own discipline, which delivered crit-
ical evaluations with the reassurance of their objectivity, lending intel-
lectual and cultural substance to colonial legal policies.
II.
The landmark case of Lewis v. Bankole was decided in the Colony of 
Lagos in 1909. The plaintiffs in Lewis claimed joint ownership rights 
to the property in question, an area of land referred to as Mabinuori’s 
Compound; in order to establish these rights, they sought a declaration 
that the land was family property—which cannot be sold according to 
customary law—rather than private property, which, in accordance with 
English common law, can be transferred through the sale of land. With 
this indigenous concept of inheritance at stake, the case goes back not to 
the onset of the family’s troubles, but to the beginning of the family itself: 
Chief Mabinuori died in 1874, leaving a family of twelve 
children, the eldest of whom was a daughter . . . In 1905 an 
action was brought by certain of Mabinuori’s grandchildren 
. . . against certain of the occupants of the family compound 
who were daughters of Mabinuori and children of a deceased 
younger son. The claim was for a declaration (1) that the plain-
tiffs were entitled, as grandchildren of Mabinuori, in conjunc-
tion with the defendants, to the family compound, and (2) that 
the family compound was the family property of Mabinuori 
deceased. (Lewis v. Bankole 81) 
In the years leading up to the decision, Mabinuori’s Compound had 
become a source of tension between the children of Mabinuori’s oldest 
son, Fagbemi, and Mabinuori’s surviving daughters. After Fagbemi’s 
death in 1881, his son Benjamin Dawodu took over the management 
of the property; after his death in 1900, his brother James Dawodu, 
one of the plaintiffs, succeeded as head of the family. During this time, 
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the management of the land—and specifi cally, the two shops that had 
been built on that land—was taken over by the defendants, Mabinuori’s 
daughters, who assumed responsibility for leasing the shops and collect-
ing the rents. The daughters’ relations with James Dawodu deteriorated, 
however, following his objection to his aunts’ dealings with a European 
fi rm. Asserting his position as head of the family by patrilineal descent, 
Dawodu and several other grandchildren of Mabinuori initiated pro-
ceedings to establish legal entitlement, together with the daughters of 
Mabinuori, to the family compound, a block of land on the north side 
of Bishop Street between the Marina and Broad Street in Lagos. 
Lewis v. Bankole was one of the fi rst cases in which native law, and 
specifi cally the notion of family property, was the governing principle. 
Acting Chief Justice Speed declared in the initial proceedings in 1908 
that “perhaps for the fi rst time the Court is asked to make a defi nite 
pronouncement on the vexed question of the tenure of what is known 
as family property by native customary law, and the principles upon 
which that law should be enforced” (Lewis v. Bankole 82). Speed ulti-
mately ruled for the defendants, arguing that the plaintiffs had received 
enough inheritance from Mabinuori to disqualify them from further 
rights over the family’s land. Six months later, however, his decision was 
overturned by the Full Court, which remitted the case to the Divisional 
Court with two instructions: the Court was to determine which native 
law or custom applied in the situation, and was to reconsider the case in 
light of that fi nding.
The task of responding to the Divisional Court’s request amounted to 
more than simply identifying the guiding principles of native property 
law, since colonial legal doctrine considered native law to be a question 
of evidence rather than law. As one judge put it in a later case, reversing 
the decision of a lower court: “The learned Judge appears to have re-
ferred to it as though it were a legal textbook of such authority as would 
warrant its citation in Court, which it certainly is not, for native law and 
custom is a matter of evidence and not of law” (Belio Adedibu v. Gbadamosi 
and Sanusi 192). To attain legal status within a colonial court, in other 
words, native law had to be proven, not merely presented. As I have al-
ready mentioned, the business of establishing this proof often involved 
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authorities, such as local chiefs or individuals with expertise in native 
traditions, who were called as witnesses to establish the law. In keeping 
with this practice, the Court in Lewis decided to conduct a trial within 
a trial, consulting experts of indigenous law in order to reconstruct the 
case along customary lines. The story of this performance, which comes 
at the conclusion of several lengthy and often convoluted explanations 
of the case, ultimately functions as the turning point in the legal pro-
ceeding, and was viewed by the Court as the key to the legal riddle that 
had been troubling Mabinuori’s family for years. 
To establish which native law applied in Lewis, the Divisional Court 
summoned a group of Lagos chiefs to simulate a series of decisions relat-
ing to the case. The chiefs, as expert witnesses, were placed under oath 
and presented with a number of situations involving the vital elements 
of the case before the Court. The Court, in other words, did not pres-
ent its expert witnesses with the case itself, but rather with a hypotheti-
cal range of scenarios, designed to extract the appropriate rule without 
divulging the case’s actual details. For each scenario, the chiefs gave their 
rulings; some concurred, others differed from each other. In the end, the 
Court seemed to weigh only those rulings backed by consensus; the dif-
ferences among the chiefs were elided, and the Court ruled that the land 
should be divided among the family members.
The procedure appeared reasonable enough. In order to ascertain the 
relevant customary law, British judges turned to native judges to see what 
their decision would look like in a native court, thereby gaining a sense 
of which precedent would operate in the case’s particular circumstances. 
What they created, however, was an illusion of precedent, in which the 
Lagos chiefs delivered opinions without binding power, performing—
rather than handing down—a series of decisions without force on their 
own terms. Their rulings could only acquire judicial power within the 
Divisional Court’s articulation and interpretation, which proceeded as 
though it had uncovered the underlying precedent rather than a range 
of possible approaches to the case. 
Given the legal reasons for relying upon expert witnesses, it is striking 
that what the Court in Lewis v. Bankole found especially praiseworthy 
in the chiefs’ testimonies was not their impartiality or judiciousness, 
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but their polished presentation. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice 
Osborne expressed his approval of the witnesses not only because their 
high social status promised accuracy and truth, but also because they 
conducted themselves appropriately. “I have no reason to doubt the cor-
rectness of the chief ’s [sic] pronouncement of the customs which exist 
in Lagos at the present day,” he notes. “Moreover, I was much impressed 
with the fair and business-like methods which they said they would have 
adopted if the case had been before them for decision” (Lewis v. Bankole 
101). Osborne responds, in other words, not only to the content, but 
also to the form of their testimonies, a form that suggests something 
other than anthropological or legal objectivity and reasserts the court’s 
dramatic—and thus subjective—production of precedent and law. 
Unlike an anthropologist, what he notes is not the chiefs’ cultural or 
legal differences, but rather a presentation that he recognizes as his own: 
a similarity so striking and impressive that it confers legitimacy upon 
the chiefs’ pronouncements. Osborne’s account of the chiefs’ conduct 
leaves one with little sense of how a court in Africa looked, or of how 
awkward and chaotic it often was. But given how deeply he is struck by 
the chiefs’ “fair and business-like methods,” one might well imagine that 
something considerably different was often the case. Along such lines, 
one might entertain a far less orderly scenario, in which two legal worlds 
with little in common were forced into jarring collision, making any 
judge relieved to discover the unexpected similarity rather than stum-
bling over differences. One observer in 1937 noted the surreal nature of 
the performance that was colonial justice:
The newcomer to Africa visiting the Courts of Law in differ-
ent parts of the country for the fi rst time views with astonish-
ment the scene before him. The presiding magistrate or Judge. 
On special occasions in his offi cial robes of scarlet, seated with 
native assessors—counsel in their robes and the prisoner in the 
dock—the crowd of spectators kept back by native police in 
uniform. A repetition of an English scene in African surround-
ings, often of a primitive nature. The whole atmosphere is ob-
viously unsuited to the African mentality. As he listens to the 
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proceedings he realises that no primitive or even partly educat-
ed native can hope to understand the workings of British jus-
tice. The Court procedure is not understood by the prisoner. If 
he is guilty and wished to admit it, he is often told to plead not 
guilty. If he desires to explain he is told he must remain silent. 
(Roberts 65–66) 
The scene comes closer to a performance—one that appears either as 
drama, comedy, even mystery—than it does to a straightforward legal 
proceeding. The chiefs’ speech acts have none of the power associated 
with the performative utterances of speech-act theory. In this particular 
colonial context, then, the seemingly performative becomes merely per-
formance. The apparently juridical language of the chiefs is drained of 
its productive capacity to bring a legal world into being: their legal pro-
nouncements exert no force in and of themselves, but instead are wholly 
dependent upon the larger power structures of colonial administration. 
By depicting the colonial courtroom as a play of costumes, stage direc-
tions, and lines spoken without knowledge or conviction, the relation-
ship between performance and law becomes descriptive rather than nor-
mative, and estranging rather than illuminating. 
The strangeness is amplifi ed, too, by the fact that not only the pres-
ence, but also the words of those on the stand were often placed in a 
different context. Thus we fi nd that the chiefs’ judgments, which else-
where would have been the law itself, become part of a story that the co-
lonial court tells about native law—a story that is reduced and subjected 
to interpretation, and fi nally to the decision of another court. The two 
worlds seem out of joint with each other—an awkwardness to which the 
court responds by noting the chiefs’ exemplary, English-like conduct. 
The judge in Lewis v. Bankole adds a procedural concern to his im-
pressions, however, by calling attention to a more directly legal matter 
in the case: the question of whether Mabinuori’s land can be transferred 
to non-family members. Even as he accepts the chiefs’ conclusion that 
the land can be partitioned and that power over it can reside with the 
family matriarch, Justice Osborne takes issue with the opinion that the 
land can never be sold:
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There is one other point to which I must allude, and that is 
whether by native customary law the family house can be let or 
sold. According to the Lagos chiefs, the present custom is that 
it can be let with the consent of all the branches of the family, 
but cannot be sold. The idea of alienation of land was un-
doubtedly foreign to native ideas in olden days, but has crept 
in as a result of the contact with European notions, and deeds 
in English form are now in common use. There is no proposal 
for a sale before me, so it is not necessary for me now to decide 
whether or no a native custom which prevents alienation is 
contrary to section 19 [containing the repugnancy clause] of 
the Supreme Court Ordinance. But I am clearly of opinion 
that despite the custom, this Court has power to order the sale 
of the family property, including the family house, in any cause 
where it considers that such a sale would be advantageous to 
the family, or the property is incapable of partition. (Lewis v. 
Bankole 104–105) 
In deferring to the expert witnesses while simultaneously asserting the 
court’s power over them, Osborne gestures towards the limits of custom-
ary law. The Lagos chiefs may be familiar with current local practices re-
garding land tenure, but the ultimate authority on the issue remains the 
colonial judge. His statement, ironically, bears a hypothetical or condi-
tional infl ection—if a sale were proposed, then the Court would order 
a sale—similar to that in the chiefs’ testimonies. There is, however, one 
crucial difference: while it may not be possible for Osborne to rule on 
the sale of property in this particular instance, he underscores his court’s 
binding authority to determine such issues in the future. In harnessing 
the power of this hypothetical mode, Osborne turns his gaze towards 
the future: to the court’s expanded jurisdiction and with it, to the pros-
pect of British ownership along British lines. The status of the past in 
Lewis v. Bankole is another matter, and I turn now to the Court’s itera-
tion of law and history—a relationship that I will suggest has as much to 
do with historical time as it does with the time it takes for the opinion 
to tell its litigants’ stories.
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III.
The story of Mabinuori’s Compound begins with the initial proceed-
ings in 1905 and ends with the 1909 verdict. The opinion is unusually 
long, owing to the fact that the case was heard by a number of different 
courts. My citations in this essay have been drawn from the fi nal phase 
of this lengthy proceeding, which embeds the opinions of lower courts 
in framing its decision. To be sure, the genealogy of Lewis v. Bankole is 
a complicated one, spanning several generations and a vast number of 
children and grandchildren. As if enacting the family repetition of suc-
cessive generations, each court records its own version of events and 
presents them at the next appellate level, creating a confusing narra-
tive that proceeds in fi ts and starts, repeating itself in spite of the fact 
that the story might well have been summarized more succinctly. Lewis 
v. Bankole rehearses these details a perplexing number of times and in 
exhaustive detail, summarizing the issues at stake and tracing their evo-
lution again and again, as if the court suffered from a kind of narra-
tive repetition compulsion. Enacting the very repetition that writing 
enables, the opinion’s reiterative prose often seems to be a desperate at-
tempt to gain mastery over a story, the complexity of which threatens to 
overwhelm even the steadiest hand. 
The length and repetition of the story, its appeal to the distant past, 
lends the opinion a resonant literariness, imbued with echoes of another 
endless trial: Jarndyce and Jarndyce of Bleak House (1853). Dickens’s 
“scarecrow of a suit” (14), without origin or endpoint, has grown to 
such labyrinthine proportions in the novel that “no man alive knows 
what it means” (14). But the resonance of this famous literary trial, in 
all its humor, futility, and absurdity, is framed in Lewis v. Bankole by a 
drastically different context than that of Victorian London. To read it 
historically is thus to politicize its rhetoric, and to understand that its 
length, unlike Jarndyce and Jarndyce, bespeaks not only law’s futility. It 
also underlines the struggle to establish the legitimacy of British rule. 
The process of legitimation set in motion by Lewis v. Bankole marks 
the opinion’s critical difference from the twists and turns of Dickens. 
Rather than extending eternally into both past and future, the case 
worked to incorporate a pre-colonial past into the fabric of colonial 
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law, lending the latter an appearance of having evolved naturally from 
the laws of the land that preceded it. Colonial legal administrators were 
thus able to write into existence a long-standing relationship with native 
law, creating a history in which British presence was an integral part. 
For even as colonialism’s supporters often justifi ed its law through the 
British integration of native customs, this justifi cation did not make 
the practice legitimate. Rather, it in fact risked underscoring just how 
constructed and potentially illegitimate such strategies in fact were. The 
repetition in Lewis v. Bankole, like that of written opinions and printed 
pages more generally, thus becomes a way to create legitimacy where 
none had existed before. As Hannah Arendt reminds us:
Power needs no justifi cation, being inherent in the very  existence 
of political communities; what it does need is legitimacy . . . Legi-
ti macy, when challenged, bases itself on an appeal to the past, 
while justifi cation relates to an end that lies in the future. (52)
The ideologies behind colonialism and colonial law had already laid 
the justifi cation for the colonial legal enterprise. This justifi cation was 
part of the process of imagining a future, one that would realize the 
Commissioner’s book in Things Fall Apart, and that would posit a nar-
rative—and with it, a world—in which colony and metropole balanced 
each other in a civilized, fruitful coexistence. What remained to be pro-
vided, however, was the legitimacy for this work, by which I mean—fol-
lowing Arendt’s reasoning—the creation of a connection between the 
colonial present and the pre-colonial past.
The narrative structure of British colonial law, which offered occa-
sions for telling old stories in their present colonial context, afforded 
just such an opportunity for legitimacy. It did so by suggesting, through 
a process that wove together colonial weft and native warp, that colonial 
law was part of the story from the beginning, and thus that the legal 
narrative had evolved through its wheels and cogs. Pierre Bourdieu, in 
“The Force of Law,” suggests that this historical effect issues from legal 
language at its most fundamental. “Juridical language,” he observes, 
“reveals with complete clarity the appropriation effect inscribed in the 
logic of the juridical fi eld’s operation. Such language combines elements 
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taken directly from the common language and elements foreign to its 
system” ( 819). 
In colonial Africa, juridical language joined forces with the particu-
larities of English common law—most notably, its doctrine of stare de-
cisis—to appropriate not only a normative universe, but also to create a 
sense of historical inevitability. Piyel Haldar thus remarks that by incor-
porating local practices into a system of precedent, colonial jurists pos-
ited English history as the regnant paradigm: 
The legis non scripta that forms the basis of the doctrine of stare 
decisis marks the common law system as being specifi cally and 
peculiarly English. It is for the English and, above all, it derives 
directly from the English since an immemorial time. . . . It is a 
law which, since before the beginning of legal memory, has de-
veloped with the slow accretions of ‘wisdom’ that evolve from 
the spirit of English existence. (450) 
The act of asserting English history as African history, moreover, rein-
forced the sense that colonialism did not simply redeem native subjects, 
but actively constituted them. As Peter Fitzpatrick concludes, the devel-
opment of colonial law meant that “[t]he colonized are relegated to a 
timeless past without a dynamic, to a ‘stage’ of progression from which 
they are at best remotely redeemable and only if they are brought into 
History by the active principle embodied in the European. It was in the 
application of this principle that the European created the native and 
the native law and custom against which its own identity and law con-
tinue to be created” (110). 
Furthermore, the act of repetition itself had the effect of making some-
thing real: a story repeated often enough eventually becomes the story, 
the offi cial version of events. The fact that legal decisions were no longer 
left to an oral tradition, but were printed and published, only accelerated 
this process of repetition: a decision disseminated as text generates an in-
fi nite possibility of repetition. Martin Chanock aptly notes, “Writing is 
the tool of administration” ( 303). Yet the potential mastery that a text’s 
circulation makes possible also illuminates the possibility that this of-
fi cial version is, at best, precarious—and at worst, illegitimate. Writing 
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and repetition, I am suggesting, do not “make something real,” but 
rather produce the effect of this real—an illusion of permanence and with 
it, a sense (rather than a guarantee) that justice has been done. Each rep-
etition thus creates the possibility—and the desire—for administrative 
mastery, and simultaneously subverts it with the prospect of mastery’s 
impossibility, and of the tenuous hold of British administration. 
IV.
Robert Cover imagines law as at once structural and temporal: for him, law 
was a way to imagine how things might be different in the future, but not 
necessarily how they might have been different in the past. Cover writes,
Law may be viewed as a system of tension or a bridge linking a 
concept of a reality to an imagined alternative—that is, a con-
nective between two states of affairs, both of which can be rep-
resented in their signifi cance only through the device of narra-
tive. (“Nomos and Narrative” 101)
In the context of colonial practice, however, Cover’s bridge takes on 
a different form, one threatening to buckle under the weight of politics 
and history. Incolonies, law became more than a bridge to the future: 
it became a way to the past; it not only reduced stories to a manageable 
size, but tore them out of context and recast them in new, more political-
ly and legally convenient terms. It extended this new context into a nar-
rative that extended the reaches of colonialism well into history—and 
thus, into legitimacy. Seen in this light, the gaps that colonial offi cials 
perceived went beyond those questions for which, in their eyes, custom-
ary law had no answers. The gaps they perceived, and those that were 
fi lled by repetition and publication, were those of their own absence. 
Colonial legal practice gave both a history to the metropole and a lan-
guage: through the work of reduction and lengthy repetition, it trans-
lated customary law into the language of English law. And in the pro-
cess, it ushered in a legacy, a claim to ownership, that was more creative 
labor than it was historical—or, for that matter, anthropological—fact. 
In making sense of colonial jurisprudence, then, to speak of “the story 
of law” would be to offer a thin description of legal practices in Africa. 
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To describe it as such is to distort the way in which the practice of colo-
nial law turned native law into stories precisely in order to dissolve their 
status as law—to interpret these stories in order to transform them into 
something else: to recast the disparate voices of the Lagos chiefs into 
a uniform body of law; or the novel Things Fall Apart, into the book 
The Pacifi cation of the Primitive Tribes of the Lower Niger. To be sure, 
Okonkwo and the Lagos chiefs still form part of the colonial narrative—
“perhaps not a whole chapter but a reasonable paragraph, at any rate.” 
When these paragraphs were spun out into narratives, subjects of colo-
nialism could be imagined as such not simply because they were under 
a British rule of law, but because this law made them subjects of much 
larger stories—and thus, subject to stories.
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